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The Freedom of the Will November 29, 2006

Posted by Martin in : Essays, Philosophy , 2comments

Ah, Free will – the great fortress of the mind from which moral responsibility and autonomy originates. This long-held view of our fellow humans shall be challenged, for I intuitively find the notion of “Free Will” to be quintessentially absurd on multiple levels.We shall handle this with using the definition of nomological determinism, which is an umbrella concept that encompasses the other classes of determinism.

Determinism – “Causal (or nomological) determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace’s demon. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. Such an entity might, under certain circumstances, be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.” (Wikipedia, 1)

There are multiple stands on the issue.

Think Determinism is false? Then you’re of the libertarian breed.

Think Determinism is true? Go to the next question.

Think Free Will is true? Then you’re a Compatibilist.

Think Free Will is false? Then you’re an Incompatibilist.

Now you know your category, but since you probably don’t know what the hell the abovementioned terms entail, I’ll explain them to you.

Compatibilists assert that regardless of determinism, free will can still exist, and there is no conflict between the two.

Incompatibilists are those that conclude that free will is incompatible with determinism; hence, it does not exist.

Now, the main reason why the debate between these positions still rages is – as always – rooted in language. By my investigations, it would seem that they use different definitions of “Free Will“.

The compatibilists go with the definition of free will with pertinence to the consequences of Determinism, stating that regardless of the causes of the action(s), the act is still “free”, insofar as it coincides with the person’s intents, desires, and preferences.

Daniel Dennett, an atheist himself, expounds on his compatibilist position.

“The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful demon, and other such possibilities, then because of chaos and quantum randomness, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are “expectations”. The ability to do “otherwise” only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown and unknowable future. Since individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist.” (Wikipedia, 1)

The problem here is that “expectations” by finite beings are very easily proven to be false, and these “expectations” in turn have no bearing on what will really happen. It doesn’t matter what you think/expect to happen, what will happen will happen regardless. It is then that the ability to do otherwise is an illusion, with respect to these expectations. Also, the noun “quantum randomness” is a misnomer, for it is not random. True, quantum physics can only determine the probability of where an electron will appear, but as it is, it uses probability, which entails a pattern, which necessarily entails other variables that affect the electron which we lack the ability to observe. Hence, it is my view that this compatibilism is false, and specious at best.

The incompatibilists, however, deny them this using a different definition of “Free Will“, one that is utilized by Standard-Issue Theology. “Free Will” is defined to be man’s being the causa sui (Ultimate Cause) of his actions, which in turn effects moral responsibility. Free Will here then causes itself, and is only mildly subject to external influence. Therefore, between Determinism
and free will, Determinism wins out.

The most recent and easily understood argument for Determinism was formulated by Carl Ginet, and is presented in the following form. It’s called the Consequence Argument.

1. “If determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature.”
2. “Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over their consequences.”
3. “Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will.”
(Wikipedia)

It is by this argument that “the ability to do otherwise” is wholly refuted.

If, for example, I drank from a can of Sprite in lieu of a Coke. After such an act, one would be seemingly justified in saying that “You could have drank from the Coke instead of the Sprite.” However, if I did do so, then it follows that I simultaneously generate a logical contradiction, a violation of natural laws, and an alteration of past events, which is quite the feat for a finite being.

Moreover, one has to consider that everything (the universe) began in its current form with the Big Bang. By both argumentation and intuition, the Big Bang, a miniscule concentration of matter and energy was geared to me typing this article on this blog. If, you say, I were to do otherwise, then that would necessarily change the conditions of the Big Bang, which would obviously create collateral changes in addition to me not typing this article. It is in this spirit that statements such as “If you hadn’t done ‘x’, then I could’ve done ‘y’” are fallacious statements in the category of Hypotheses Contrary to Fact, for if you did do otherwise, there would be collateral changes due to the abovementioned arguments, which would make the certainty of you doing “y” very dubious at best.
As you may have noticed, the topic of “Free Will” is quite expansive in itself, entailing a whole lot of things on the fields of ethics, politics, science, etc.

However, I shall leave it at that, for I only aimed to tackle the existence of it; I’ve no control over the consequences of discourse. :)

As always, I could be wrong.
You know my one and only dogma – “Hold no dogmas, save for this one.”

Primary Sources – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will, various library books whose authors I forgot.
Secondary Sources – Wikipedia’s sources.
Tertiary Sources – Intuition and Logic.
Inspiration – Misha, a free will advocate. Lol. Sorry Allen, although I’m not sure why I’m apologizing.


The Begging the Question / Stolen Concept Fallacy November 14, 2006

Posted by Martin in : Philosophy , 1 comment so far

As mentioned in the previous post, the Stolen Concept fallacy, when brought under analysis, shows the one guilty of committing the fallacy to be likely an idiot, although this is a non-sequitur, perhaps even a small-sample bias – I digress.The fallacy was coined by a certain Ayn Rand, a Russian philosopher of the 20th century, one who championed what is now known as “Objectivism”, a philosophy which stands for objective epistemology, among others.

Essentially, the Stolen Concept fallacy is “…the other side, the reverse, of ‘petitio principii.’ If this last is ‘begging the question‘ or ‘assuming that which you are attempting to prove,’ then ‘the stolen concept‘ is ‘begging the answer‘ or ‘assuming that which you are attempting to disprove.‘ – Ayn Rand (Journals of Ayn Rand, pg 704).

As stated, it’s the reverse of “a petitio principii“, that is, begging the question. For the unenlightened, this fallacy (begging the question) is committed when one has, in his argument, a probably false, or at least disputed and hidden co-premise. The argument can still be valid, but if the hidden premise is shown to be untrue, then it is wholly unsound. To illustrate…

———-

“Communism is the best type of government because it is anti-religion.”

In argumentative form…

Communism is anti-religion. Therefore, it is the best type of government.

The unstated premise here is that a government’s that is anti-religion merits its being the best; hence, it is fallacious. The truth of the premise is in contention here, not the validity of the structure; this differentiates it from the formal fallacy of Circular Reasoning, however seemingly similar they may be.

Other examples would be:

“The Bible says God exists. Ergo, God exists.”
Hidden premise: The Bible is true.

“He is Chinese. Ergo, he owns a Honda Civic.”
Hidden premise: All Chinese own Honda Civics.

It’s somehow infuriating when one uses such arguments to enforce his point, really.

——————–

Now you know what a petitio principii (Begging the Question) is. Congratulations. Now, onto the Stolen Concept fallacy, one that we see everyday. Okay, maybe it is one that a few of us see everyday, but nonetheless, we delve into its rationale.As stated above, the Stolen Concept is the opposite of Begging the Question; if the latter assumes what you are attempting to prove, the former assumes what you are attempting to disprove. So you try to disprove something, only to see that you actually assumed it all along.

Sound inane? Don’t be so surprised when you discover that you yourself have committed this fallacy.

Examples:

“All property is theft.” – For theft to even occur, one would need private property. No property = no theft. Hence, the contradiction lies in assuming theft while denying property.

“There is no true or false.” – So you’ve “proven” that statement to be true?

“I do not exist.” – So that’s why you can think of that.

And some very idiotic ones mentioned before…

“I have faith in reason.” – Gee, I wonder how you came to that conclusion.

“Logic is baseless.” – Yet you assume logic’s axioms and validity to create that argument.

See the inanity in the fallacy of the Stolen Concept? Wonderful.

What? You don’t? Too bad. You probably don’t care, anyway.

Should I be sorry for the simplicity of the article? Hmmm.